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I. INTRODUCTION
Accountability of the judiciary in transitional societies merits critical analysis. This article argues a case for extending the purview of truth-telling processes to the judiciary in postauthoritarian contexts. The driving force behind the inquiry is the proposition that the judiciary as the third arm of government at all times participates in governance. The paucity of critical perspectives on the role of the judiciary during a society's troubled period could lead to the view that it lacks a distinct role in governance. To contextualize the argument, I focus on judicial governance and accountability within the paradigms of Nigeria's transition to democracy after decades of authoritarian rule. Historically, Nigeria, a former British colony, started out its postindependence existence as a Westminster-type political arrangement but subsequently translated into an American-styled federation.
The course of governance in the country (the judicial aspect being of specific interest in this article) has been and continues to be influenced by its historical antecedents and current political affinities. Comparative insights from both the British and American legal and political experiences are thus germane to a discussion of the country's judicial institution and are explored in this article.
I set out by considering two critical issues framed as queries to be addressed in this inquiry, which seeks to generate scholarly interest in an otherwise neglected perspective in transitional justice theory and state practice. First, should it not be the case that the judiciary is held to account for its role in societal experience of gross violations of human rights and impunity? Secondly, what is the relevance of such inquiry? It is anticipated that the inquiry will unearth the significance of the role played by the judiciary in This is an author version of the article in Law and Policy (2008) 30 (2) 194-226. The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com.
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authoritarian societies and the circumstances underlying judicial preferences. I then proceed to evaluate the role of the judiciary in transitional contexts in view of its institutional participation in governance. Specific focus is on the attitude of the judiciary to the truth-seeking process as a complementary tool in the search for justice after a period of gross human rights violations.
The article identifies a tension in the interface between the truth-seeking process and efforts to call the judiciary to account. The tension originates from the view that such accountability seriously undermines the integrity of the judiciary as a key institution of the state (particularly in transitional societies) while the path of nonaccountability challenges the viability of the truth-telling mechanism in achieving transitional justice. I argue that the adoption of an approach that accords proper appreciation of the transitional context and fundamental principles of international law (specifically human rights and humanitarian law) significantly eases the tension. I further contend that inherent in the approach is the potential for institutional transformation and relegitimization of the vital judicial function that had become delegitimized by years of acquiescence to authoritarianism.
II. STATE POWERS AND THE JUDICIARY
According to one prominent way of thinking, government as delegated powers are vested by a collective (the people) in the modern state. Thus, government is the custodian of the common interest. The people however retains "popular sovereignty" and demand accountability from rulers (March and Olsen 1995: 151) . State powers in legal and political conceptions are divided between the three institutions: the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary (Vile 1967) .
Any institution or group that has the capacity to influence how others experience the "vulnerabilities" of existence both as individuals and groups wields a form of power in society (Poggi 2001: 203) . This ability to change an existing state of affairs is the cardinal feature of power. It entails the capacity to have others act or refrain from acting in a particular manner. In the power game, there are different groups in active contest for dominance, each utilizing specific inherent advantages to achieve supremacy. However, the different power bases in the struggle to undermine the influence of others become constrained in that quest by certain self-limiting factors (ibid.: 204).
The self-limiting factor of the judiciary, namely that it does not initiate the process for the exercise of its power notwithstanding, contemporary social experience indicates it is endowed with the resources with which it can and does influence society. Two recent 196 examples lend credence to this view. One is the historic decision of the U.S. Supreme The foregoing examples reveal that judicial decisions in specific cases affect not only the parties before a court. In practice, judicial determinations impact on others in the wider society who, in most instances, will never subject themselves to the direct jurisdiction of a court. They affect civil rights, individual freedoms, and property rights (at the microlevel) and thus influence or, in some cases, dictate outright, the course of political, social, cultural, and economic development (at the macrolevel). In that way, the judiciary perforce shares in the burdens of governance. Thus the nature of the judicial role constitutes it into a major machinery of the state. In that vantage position, Griffith notes, the judiciary takes part in political decision making (1997: 292-93) . Thus, the subversion of the judicial institution by incidence of social dislocations of authoritarianism justifies public scrutiny in postauthoritarian contexts not so much as an indictment on the institution but, more importantly, to draw out relevant lessons for desired transformation.
For the most part however, transitional justice research has focused on the role of the executive and the legislature in societies that have witnessed gross violations of human rights and impunity with scarce attention paid to the judicial function. Yet, so critical is the role of the judiciary in the exercise of powers in the modern state that "a government is not a government without courts" (Hart and Wechsler 1976: 16) .
In recent times, the powers of the judiciary have become incrementally visible, owing particularly to the "rights revolution of the twentieth century." The situation has led to concerns about "the emergence of government by judiciary" (Loughlin 2003: 212-13 ).
The growth of judicial powers in relation to the other arms of government has become more noticeable in the post-World War II period (Barak 2003: 21) . The growing importance of the judiciary should be expected, granted that it is one of the institutions of the state-wielding some of the powers of the state in the task of ensuring good governance, freedom, equality, and social justice (Held 2004: 391 
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The executive and the legislature (even if with differing emphasis) have been viewed as prime movers of the process of development and assessed along those lines. But the role of the judicial institution as an integral part of, and key contributor to governance and development, has been largely unacknowledged and ignored (Ogowewo 2005: 39) . This may be due in part to the contestable notion that it is the least dangerous arm of government (Berns 1997) .
The lack of initiative to exercise its institutional power unless moved by an aggrieved party may be another contributory factor (Nwabueze 1997:49 ). Yet, dependent on sociopolitical factors, the powers wielded by the courts 1 1 may expand in dimensions that substantially reduce powers exercised by the other two branches of government (Winter Jr. 1997: 29) .
In a democracy, a correlate of the exercise of powers by any institution is the requirement of accountability. As Theberge argues with reference to the Supreme Court of the United States, the immense powers wielded by the judiciary necessitates its being subjected to similar objective and informed scrutiny applicable to the executive and the legislative branches. This is more particularly so in jurisdictions where judicial tenure is for life (Theberge 1997: 176) .
The exercise of power in democratic societies involves a measure of developing accounts.
Such accounts serve to define the past and choices made in the course of it. An important utilitarian function of democratic accounting is the promise it holds for establishing trust between the people and the government (March and Olsen 1995: 46) . Governance through authoritarianism, with the incidence of egregious violations of human rights and breaches of the rule of law, results in social displacement and distortions between the government and the governed. It is accordingly arguable that comprehensive accountability in the transition to democracy and the rule of law is a key requisite for addressing the resultant disequilibrium in society.
In discussing judicial accountability, the system of appeals to superior courts no doubt constitutes a check and, some reckon, adequate form of accountability for the judiciary (Prefontaine and Lee 1998 
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Some factors may however militate against appeals as a form of judicial accountability.
The complex web of legal processes, social and economic costs of litigation, absence or inadequacy of legal aid, and the limitations of educational development in developing countries in general (by and large the sites of transitional justice processes) and Nigeria in particular (Oko 2000: 611) , suggest the need for a system of checks directly and easily accessible to the public at transitional moments. Further, it is plausible to argue that the fundamental premise of the appeal paradigm of accountability is the presumption of democracy and good governance, the absence of which is precisely in issue in postauthoritarian societies. Thus, it is apposite in such contexts to obtain accountability by other mechanisms.
III. JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE RULE OF LAW
The ability of citizens to enforce their rights against the state (as well as other individuals)
is critical to the modern conception of the rule of law (Loughlin 2003: 209) . The case for accountability of the judiciary is reinforced by this need since the judicial function is central to the realization of the right. There must be no doubts as to the integrity and commitment of the judicial institution to ensuring the rule of law (as against the rule of men) in furtherance of the public purpose and popular sovereignty.
Under the concept of popular sovereignty, the three institutions of governance hold power as agents of the people (Watkins Jr. 2007: 2 
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It is certainly the case that some understandings of the rule of law were deployed by erstwhile tyrannical regimes in the exercise of power. This was the case for instance in Nazi Germany, apartheid South Africa, and authoritarian military regimes in Africa and Latin America. It would appear that a conception of the rule of law, which emphasizes or relies on "people-power" or, in more formal terms, popular sovereignty, holds strong promise for enduring fundamental changes aspired to in transitioning societies. The
American transition from colonialism, struggle for independence, and the pivotal role of the people in its constitutional development in the late eighteenth century (Kramer 2004) in particular provides strong precedent for societies seeking to assert popular power in transitioning states.
Proceeding on this understanding of the rule of law, a publicly accessible process of scrutiny (arguably offered by the truth-seeking mechanism) can be expected to restore some measure of judicial credibility and public confidence in the judiciary. To insist otherwise, namely that any institution was beyond public scrutiny conducted in a plainly public manner afforded by a truth-telling process in a transitioning society, may fly in the face of the admitted significance of transformation in such societies. It amounts to conceding to the judiciary certain omnipotence it has been all too ready to deny the other two arms of government through the instrumentality of judicial review. More crucially, such a proposition is tantamount to a direct inversion of popular sovereignty and the imposition of judicial supremacy (Watkins 2007: 101) .
IV. THE JUDICIARY IN AUTHORITARIAN CONTEXTS
The regular if not immediate casualties of military rule in democratic states are the executive and the legislature (Ogowewo 2005 : 42, Aihe 1971 . The continued existence of both institutions is incompatible with military intrusion into governance. To a large extent, the military leaves the judiciary nominally intact but usually severely compromised.
Why do military usurpers of the democratic-will sack the executive and legislature but leave the judicial institution intact? Two factors can be advanced for this. The first is the legitimating function (rather than the ironic, oft-repeated respect for the rule of law) that the judiciary accords military usurpation of power. This secures political legitimacy for the usurpers (Ogowewo 2005: 43; Mahmud 1994: 103-04 
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orders as well as to the societal acceptance of such orders and decisions (Zurn 2004 Military regimes, perhaps more than any other form of government, invariably desire a judiciary it can subjugate. Despite that, military autocrats aspire that the judiciary as well as judges are perceived as being independent (Loughlin 2003: 62-63) . Thus, it is may be rather simplistic to justify judicial acquiescence to military authoritarianism (as some constitutional law scholars have sought to do) on the basis of the latter's complete control of the powers of coercion and perceived self-sufficiency (Mahmud 1994: 104) .
The claim of self-sufficiency, in view of the recurring action of usurpers in preserving the judiciary in virtually all instances of military incursion into power in postcolonial commonwealth states (Mahmud 1994) , suggests it is at best exaggerated. In view of the ambivalent disposition of military regimes to the judiciary, it is relevant to critically examine the exercise of judicial power in authoritarian contexts in periods of transition.
V. THE CASE FOR JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN TRANSITIONS
It can be argued that institutional accountability for past (mis)conduct with a view to strengthening weak or transforming derelict state structures is one of the fundamental ways to foster the viability of democracy and the rule of law. Such accountability facilitates acknowledgement of institutional shortcomings that is key to achieving transformation of strategic state institutions and constitutes a definitive progression to democratic governance and movement away from repression (Ni Aolain and Campbell 2005; 184, 207) .
In general terms, an accountability relationship exists where a group or other entity demands an agent to report on the agent's activities (Keohane 2003: 157) . It has also been considered to be the right to hold an agent "to answer for performance that involves 201 some delegation of power" (Romzek and Dubnick: 236) . Political accountability proceeds on the precept that individual or institutional actors who act on behalf of the community and are funded from public resources be accountable to the ordinary citizens.
The democratic accountability process requires a record of individual and institutional roles in governance as well as responsibility for the results achieved and the means deployed in the process (March and Olsen 1995: 150 A number of mundane objections may be canvassed for the futility of a case for judicial accountability. One is that a sizeable number of the population, particularly in Africa, are excluded by a legal system that is at once culturally alien and commonly conducted in a foreign language. Related to this is the fact that the intricacies of the merits of the jurisprudence to which the judiciary subscribed in particular cases is typically beyond the grasp of the generality of the people (even those who have an appreciable level of education). Thus, the outcome of such accountability process may only be accessible to a privileged class of, largely, legally trained technocrats.
In response, it can be posited that avenues for public education and enlightenment by those who can access the information to overcome this barrier can be created to further the course of the fundamental objectives of transitional justice and accountability. In any case, it cannot be the argument that the incidence of language barriers should be allowed to deprive a people of their rights. On the contrary, the opposite may be the more plausible argument-namely that the existence of language barriers is reflective of the denial of such rights.
Another possible objection is the perspective that the judiciary was itself victim of the sociopolitical system that disempowered the institution in the face of a sovereign parliament. I will deal with this below in the context of what I consider to be institutional objections.
A further objection is the need to maintain and protect the collegiality of the judiciary in the period of transition. At the heart of the collegiality argument is the need to maintain a 202 rancour-free atmosphere for judicial officers who had served in the old order (and are, at the least, tainted with complicity for human rights violations) and those newly appointed by the postconflict government following transition to ensure institutional cohesion and stability. In countering this objection, it is possible to argue that the narrow objective of individual collegiality ought not to be allowed to frustrate the wider claims of the society at large to institutional rectitude and transformation that accountability is expected to foster.
Having disposed of what I refer to above as mundane objections, it is relevant to examine in some detail the institutional objections to the case for accountability of the judiciary in transitional contexts.
A. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 2
The need for judicial independence constitutes a potent argument for critics of a call for public accountability of the judicial role. However, the call is based on what can be regarded as an overarching and implied legitimate political expectation of the people within the legal and political paradigm of popular sovereignty as developed by Locke (Loughlin 2003: 162-75) . The people are empowered to demand an account from their agent as constituted by the government of which the judiciary forms a part. In any event, as Karlan notes, "Judicial independence is . . . not an end in itself" (1999: 537); rather as one of the most renowned English jurists admitted, it confers great responsibility on judges (Denning 1978: 63) . It is conceded that the principle of judicial independence is crucial to the judicial function.
The principle is enshrined in most modern constitutions, and in countries with unwritten constitutions, like Britain, the principle has by convention been entrenched sometimes over centuries of practice (ibid.: 55-102). The critical question however is whether such privileged position and strong foundations ought to shield the institution from public scrutiny?
The principle in all of its importance for the adjudicatory role and dispensation of justice ought not to be allowed to override the need for accountability for powers conferred on any institution of state. Justification for the foregoing position includes the fact that judicial independence is not a perquisite of judicial office. In its conception, the principle is, like judicial power itself, designed for the benefit of citizens (Gleeson 2005: 1) , and it is commonly recognized that respect for courts is essentially directed at the institution and not the person of the individual judge. Respect for and compliance with judicial decisions is fostered by the belief in the impartiality of the judiciary. It is not meant to cast a sanctimonious cloak around individual judges.
This is an author version of the article in Law and Policy (2008) 30 (2) 194-226. The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com.
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The fundamental doctrinal basis of the principle of judicial independence is the desire to obviate potential constraints to the exercise of the judicial function. Institutional independence is necessary to secure the role of the judiciary as the institution charged with protection of the individual from oppression. The principle, guaranteed not only by national but also a considerable number of significant international human rights instruments (Friedland 1996: 622-29) , 4 entails both "negative" and "positive" aspects.
Both turn on the need to institutionalize measures designed to liberate judges from external constraints and promote their ability to follow their conscience in the proper adjudication of disputes (Karlan 1999: 537-48) .
The view that judicial independence inures to the benefit of citizens validates the case for public accountability of the judiciary. The right to demand societal scrutiny or public account of the exercise of judicial power in whatever form flows from the conferment of that power by society on the judicial institution. Thus, it can be asserted that the claim to
Independence is hollow and ought to be disregarded as justification for rebuffing public accountability.
The implication of the right as belonging to citizens is that it is in the nature of a public right. There is judicial support for the view that public rights, unlike private rights provided in the constitution, cannot be waived. The Nigerian case, R Ariori & Ors. v Muraimo B O Elemo & Ors.(1983) provides judicial support for this proposition. In that case, parties purported to consent to waiver of their right to speedy hearing of the title to land, which was in issue in the matter. The Nigerian Supreme Court held, inter alia, that speedy trial, a component of the constitutionally guaranteed right to fair hearing was in the nature of a public right. It rejected claims of waiver by the consent of litigating parties on the premise that it fell outside the ambit of their private rights or prerogatives.
In the same way, the right to public scrutiny or demand for accountability of the judiciary is in the nature of one that cannot be interfered with or waived. It is a right vested in society at all times and arguably ought to come into sharper focus in transitional contexts.
The right to accountability being a public one, any institutional attempt at, or claim to waiver of the right, is not only counterintuitive but ought to be rejected for being patently illegal and in violation of the rule of law.
The security of tenure, which is a near-universal feature of judicial office (and thus the Law as a tool of "social engineering" (Lloyd 1991: 210) constitutes a medium for the achievement of other social goals. On this view of the role of law, the judiciary is required to dissociate itself from the formalist interpretation of judicial independence as an impregnable fortress that sets the institution on a pedestal beyond the reach of society.
The normative account of judicial independence that seeks to oust the judiciary from accountability for its role in authoritarianism should be rejected. Such an approach to the function or purpose of the principle runs contrary to transparency in governance, an essential democratic value.
Judicial immunity is closely tied to the independence of the judiciary and is usually regarded as an integral part of the latter. I consider it separately to allow for more focus on why it should not stand in the way of judicial scrutiny in transitions. It has been recognized that public accountability assists in ensuring judges discharge their duties in a disaffected manner (Friedland 1996: 606) . This is in itself necessary for building, restoring, or ensuring public confidence in the judiciary and a requisite for resort to law rather than self-help. Ensuring such trust is reposed in the judiciary can only be negotiated away with grave consequences for a fragile polity as obtains in a transitioning society.
Lack of public trust and confidence in the judicial system is fatal to societal cohesion, peace, and development. Since the judiciary commands neither the money controlled by the legislature nor the force at the service of the executive, public confidence is at the heart of obedience to judicial decisions (Gleeson 2005: 1-2) . In particular, the dynamics of transitional justice lends itself to the argument that the claim to judicial independence must be balanced against actual judicial outcomes (Karlan 1999: 558).
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In the event there is substantial measure of consensus that the judicial function has been conducted in some inappropriate manner, the need to reach beyond the shield of judicial immunity assumes an imperative. It should hardly be a task undertaken to establish such a state of affairs in transitional societies that had labored under authoritarian rule, war, institutionalized discrimination like apartheid, or other forms of substantial social displacement. The jurisprudence of transitional justice revolves around the restoration of rights, justice, and the rule of law. Teitel has rightly noted that one of the key features of transitional societies is a fundamental inquiry into the legitimacy of societal institutions including the judiciary (1997: 2030) . Such an inquiry is not the least bit compelling where any of the institutions are viewed as victims of the troubled period.
C. THE JUDICIARY AS VICTIM
The judiciary as an institution, much like other arms of a democratic society, may be a victim of authoritarian rule in the same way political institutions (executive and legislative) were displaced by military rule in Africa and Latin America. It may even suffer in perhaps more individualized ways, like the fate of judicial officers in Rwanda in the course of the genocide in that country. As a result, it is possible to take the position that the judicial institution ought to be excused from accountability in transition as a victim.
But that argument quickly loses force when it is considered that a truthseeking process is in fact primarily designed in part (if not essentially) to ease the burden of victimsindividuals and groups (it has hardly been suggested that institutional victims are precluded)-of rights violations by providing a forum for a narration and acknowledgment of their sufferings.
Further, where the choice of the truth-seeking process is made to establish a credible record of violations of human rights and subversion of the rule of law with a possible view to social acknowledgment, reconciliation, reparation, and fostering rule of law, no institution of state, least that avowed to upholding the rule of law, should be insulated from scrutiny. This is imperative if only to ascertain the judiciary, like other institutions that have functioned under abnormal conditions, is retuned to the aspirations of society in the transition from authoritarianism to democracy (Teitel 1997: 39 ).
An inquiry into the propriety of the judicial role or the judiciary been required to tell its truths in a transition process is germane to obtaining a complete record of a period of gross violations of human rights and impunity in a nation's history. It could possibly 207 achieve more. Such endeavour has the potential to advance the justification (some insist in the face of insurmountable constraints) for the course of judicial governance in the period. This perspective is relevant in view of the concession by a notable protagonist of the relevance of truth commissions in transition that "moral or meta-ethical debates feed directly into jurisprudential questions about whether and to what extent law-even in domestic systems-provides meaningful guidance for the judges who implement it" (Asmal 2000: 2) .
What is the role of judges in authoritarian or even conflicted societies? Are they "unconstrained moral actors or bureaucratic functionaries effectively bereft of discretion, because the law tells them what to do and leaves them no choice to do otherwise?" (ibid.:
5). Should it be one that is insulated from the dictates of changes in society? Or should the judicial role be in a state of flux, subject to the vagaries of its environment (Barak 2003: 25) ?
These are by no means easy questions, and there have been ongoing debates on them and related issues on the judicial function all emphasizing the crucial role of the judiciary in society. A process of scrutiny is well positioned to address these concerns. The South Africa transition process attempted such scrutiny.
VI. JUDGING THE JUDGES?
Happily, the precedent set by the South Africa truth and reconciliation commission (TRC) in this regard is the subject of an incisive analysis by Dyzenhaus. In his aptly titled book,
Judging the Judges (Dyzenhaus 2003) , he addressed the response of the judiciary to the truth-seeking process that was at the center of the country's efforts to recover justice for victims and achieve reconciliation in its transition to popular democracy.
The attempt was all but roundly rebuffed by the South African judiciary. Unlike the various professional bodies representing lawyers (barristers, advocates and solicitors) no serving judge, despite repeated requests, turned up at the scheduled three-day public "Legal Hearing." The judiciary contended in the written memorandum, submittedostensibly on its behalf-by Justice Michael Corbett (then Chief Justice of the apartheid era), that the proposition was plainly unworkable and in outright violation of the muchcoveted principle of judicial independence. The argument was further advanced by the judiciary that a past-focused enquiry threatened progress and could disrupt the march into the future. Thus, the judges stayed away, and their failure to attend the summons of the TRC was described as the "most conspicuous feature" of the three-day hearings (ibid.:
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It was also argued for the judiciary that it was impracticable for the TRC to embark on the exercise that would require a case-by-case analysis of records in the absence of counsel. In all events, the record had been impressive, particularly in view of parliamentary supremacy. "There was little to be gained from lamenting the past" (ibid.).
This position, canvassed by Chief Justice Corbett, Dyzenhaus notes is clearly in "tension" with the reliance on the same records by Corbett as the basis for his contention that public accountability of the judiciary in South Africa was not necessary since they reveal that the judiciary had in fact performed creditably.
The TRC Legal Hearings were regarded by the commission itself as the most crucial of a series of special hearings in view of the place of the law in apartheid. Lawyers and the judges were brought under scrutiny for their role in applying apartheid law. Lawyers and, more so, judges, it was alleged, failed to exercise their discretion when they could have in their interpretation and daily application of discriminatory laws. For Dyzenhaus, the judges had no excuse for upholding unconscionable apartheid laws (ibid.: 28).
Dyzenhaus challenged the view, canvassed in the written memorandum of the judiciary, that judges were "disempowered" in the face of parliamentary sovereignty. Judges who subscribed to this view under the principle of the plain fact rule of interpretation were guilty of "judicial dereliction of duty."
He insists that the duty of judges is to maintain the rule of law that requires justice to be done at all times. It is the duty of judges to uphold "moral ideals" (ibid.: 161) even in the event that they may have their decisions overturned by appeals or trumped by countermanding legislation that was in reality a practice of the legislature during the apartheid era. Judicial resistance to apartheid laws through a purposive approach that gave primacy to common law principles of equality, equity, and fairness could at least place the government in a very uncomfortable position though it was most unlikely to alter government policy. Such conscientious objections had the potential to place the government in a position where it would, through legislation, have to admit it was operating outside rather than within the ambit of the rule of law.
Dyzenhaus argues further that where the historical record strongly suggests judges have failed in upholding their oaths of office to maintain fidelity to law (and his conception of law is one indivisible from morals), they ought to be called to account for their failure.
He posits that in such situations, recourse cannot be had to judicial independence as a shield.
Independence of judges, he maintains, will not be compromised by the public hearings on how such independence was in fact compromised (ibid.: 59 209 examine the role of the Nigerian judiciary and the need for accountability in the transition from authoritarian rule.
VII. TRANSITION AND JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY: THE NIGERIAN CONTEXT
To allow for a proper understanding of the discussion on judicial accountability in Nigeria, it is appropriate to briefly set out the political and judicial contexts that with the promulgation of a hurriedly produced and imposed constitution.
The newly elected administration of President Olusegun Obasanjo took a cue from the various truth processes in Latin America and South Africa and announced the establishment of the Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission less than three weeks after its inauguration. The Commission came to be popularly known as the "Oputa Panel," so named after the chairman (Yusuf 2007: 269-73 151-52). The first and last factors implicated judicial governance in the country as will be discussed below.
Successive constitutions of the country provided for a secure judicial term of office limited only by attainment of specified statutory age. The judicial branch of government thus remained the relatively most stable during the authoritarian period and after, a fact that I argue, among others (below), justifies scrutiny of the judicial role in the transition period.
VIII. TRANSITION, TRUTH, AND THE ACCOUNTABILITY GAP
A critical evaluation of judicial impact on governance ensures that the judiciary is assigned its "fair share of the credit: for the state of affairs in any nation. That "fair share" can also be on the debit side (Ogowewo 2005: 39) . The judiciary like any other institution ought not to loathe taking the credit for its positive contributions to the course of governance and the exercise of state powers. In the same way, common sense dictates that it should submit itself to criticisms for its failures. This is relevant at all times.
However, it assumes the nature of a compelling obligation in transitional contexts particularly where there is substantial basis to adduce complicity (Veitch 1999) to the judiciary for a situation of sustained gross violations of human rights and impunity.
In spite of the precedent set by the South Africa TRC, the Nigerian truth-seeking process neglected to focus attention on the judiciary. Through that neglect (with the seeming acquiescence of civil society), human rights groups, the legal profession, and the Nigerian public missed the opportunity to develop the theme of establishing the truth about judicial governance in the most populous black nation in the world. It is significant to note in this regard that the truth-telling process itself ultimately became a major casualty of that oversight (Yusuf 2007 
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The failure of the Oputa Panel in this regard is rather intriguing considering that the The inquiry instituted by the late dictator, General Sanni Abacha, was headed by another respected retired Supreme Court Justice, Kayode Eso, with the report named after him. It did expose some unsavory details about the judicial institution in the country. Suffice it to say however that the inquiry was about the state rather than the role of the judiciary during years of military authoritarian rule in the country and was by no means an attempt at public scrutiny of the judiciary in the transitional context. In any case, the latter remit was temporally beyond the purview of the Eso Panel, which was constituted by and conducted under military rule. Thus, such satisfaction on the part of the Oputa Panel could be regarded as misplaced and out of tune with transitional justice considerations.
There are several factors that justify a public accounting of the judicial role in governance during the period of authoritarian rule in the country. They can be broadly categorized: the legal-jurisprudential aspect and a sociopolitical nature.
IX. LEGAL-JURISPRUDENTIAL DIMENSION

A. LEGITIMIZING MILITARY RULE
The highest court in Nigeria, the Supreme Court Providing an account of judicial governance accords popular supremacy to the people and promotes the rule of law by demonstrating that the judiciary itself is subject to law. It also reflects the responsiveness of the judiciary to societal sensitivities, both of which are critical to its institutional viability. Recent events in Pakistan where the public have rallied behind the Chief Justice, Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudry as a symbol of democracy against the usurper, General Pervez Musharraf, is quite instructive in this regard (Khan 2007 ).
The question of judicial accountability in transition seeks the production of a record of judicial governance to highlight the nature, course, and impact of the judicial function in the period of social displacement occasioned by authoritarian rule or violent conflict. Is it not the case that the judiciary served to perpetuate a subversion of the constitution that established it and to which it was sworn to protect? In the Nigerian context, the question can be raised as to why, for instance, did the Supreme Court not give consideration to the question of the origin of its judicial powers in the foregoing cases?
According to Mahmud, any court that evinces a serious inclination toward "strict constitutionalism" in the aftermath of a coup d'état is ab initio obliged to consider the sources of its own powers to determine whether they are derived from the "old" or "new" It may be the case that there is a need to protect the judiciary from being made pliant to unbridled subjection to public opinion and that it maintains some respectable distance from the flux of (sometimes indeterminate) popular opinion. It is however in the institutional interest of the judiciary that such autonomy be conditioned by the realities of the society from which it derives authority if it hopes to maintain relevance. The demands of the period of transition, when the need for social restructuring is more imperative than at any other, is perhaps the most momentous for the display of such recognition.
In the Nigerian situation, the case for judicial accountability is made stronger by the fact that judicial officers are usually not only unelected (Ogowewo 2005: 40) , unlike some 
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There is consensus within and outside legal circles in Nigeria that the judiciary has been palpably corrupt. It had become a notorious fact that in the period of authoritarian military rule in the country, justice was available for sale to the highest bidder. The situation in the courts had become so bad that trials had turned into "charades" manipulated by well-heeled litigants.
The situation was complicated further by "unethical lawyers" and "faithless judges" (Olowofoyeku 1989: 67-68; Oko 2006: 14-17) . The deplorable situation had even been lamented by Justice Oputa who was to head the Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission (HRVIC) almost two decades earlier (Oputa 1981: 9) .
The perception that corruption exists in the judiciary has not changed, though a recent analysis suggests it has been reduced (Osinbajo 2007) . The perception has been carried over into the transition period (Oko 2006: 19-20, 26, 31) . compounded by a legacy of questionable appointments characterized by nepotism and prebendalism (Oko 2006: 48-54) .
B. PUBLIC APATHY FOR DUE PROCESS OF LAW
Public mistrust of the judiciary constitutes a danger to societal cohesion and respect for the rule of law. Citizens may resort to self-help rather than have recourse to the law and the judicial institution to resolve disputes. The effect of resultant distortions may be fraught with serious negative consequences for hitherto troubled societies where a considerable number of citizens may be faced with the challenges of coming to terms with the hurt they have suffered in the past that still remain with them. Thus, calls for reform of the judiciary have been particularly strident from stakeholders even in the transition period. Voicing the concern of civil society groups, Joseph Otteh, Executive
Director of Access to Justice, a leading nongovernmental organization focused on the judicial sector, stated that the judiciary required a "full turn around maintenance" in view of the perversion of the rule of law occasioned by structural deficiencies of that branch of government (Ahiante 2003) .
Cynicism about the relevance of judicial governance had developed in Nigeria. This was due in part to the dysfunctional judiciary that was steeped in corruption (Oko 2006: 24-31) . In turn, the public attacked the judicial institution. Judicial decisions became highly suspect, sometimes without justification but owing to the persistent institutional reputation for corruption. How did the judiciary come to such infamy as a largely failed institution in the Nigerian polity?
An account of the circumstances under which the judicial role was performed is required not only for its historical value, though this may be value enough. Rather, it ought to be produced for its socioanthropological potential of providing a viable prognosis for the Thus it is still proper to contend in the Nigerian context (like Dyzenhaus did in the case of South Africa) that the people were entitled to know why judges, who were despite their vantage positions to affect the course of governance, neglected the opportunity but "made the wrong moral choice" (Dyzenhaus 2003: 89-90) . This is the case because, like in South Africa, Nigerian judges could have maintained fidelity to law (and it is again crucial to note that few did) since they were not required to follow the orders of the 
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institutional transformation following a period of siege is critical to the survival of democracy and the rule of law.
XI. CONCLUSION
The iconography of Justitia, the familiar symbol of law and justice, is one of the few that has continued to survive Renaissance art. Both the citizen and the state remain in obeisance to the image of the female, a regally robed and impersonal goddess. The reason for this, as succinctly stated by Loughlin, is the necessity of the state to maintain order. The judiciary plays a key role in the maintenance of that order (Loughlin 2003: 61-62) .
While Loughlin's position is arguably more apposite in a democratic society, it nonetheless has resonance in authoritarian societies as the Nigerian experience has
shown. The military at no point in the course of its hold on political power in the country laid claim to judicial capability in the way it was quick at emphasizing its leadership abilities derived from military training to justify its hold on power where the political class had failed.
I contend that this state of affairs constitutes a potent weapon for the defense of the rule of law and human rights by the judiciary and, for our purposes, stronger justification for insisting that the judicial institution maintain an unwavering fidelity to law in all circumstances. Some scholars insist there are grave limitations to or even no latitude at all available for affecting the state of affairs against a military regime bent on having its way (Ojo 1971) . While this may be tenable in certain circumstances, I have argued (like Dyzenhaus) that the "tales of disempowerment" such a position portends may not be adequately represented in the totality of judicial experience in illiberal regimes. In any case, there is much to be said for the need for judicial accountability in the transition period for the tacit admission of complicity in governance inherent in that position.
The crux of Dyzenhaus's position on the Legal Hearings of the TRC appears to be that the institutionalization of apartheid and the violation of human rights of a large segment of South African society, which violations were aided by the judiciary, made judicial accountability in South Africa a moral if not a legal imperative in the country's transition to popular democracy. It can similarly be contended that the existence of a nascent democracy in postcolonial Nigeria, which was cut short barely six years after independence by mutinous soldiers whose adventurism led to the subsequent takeover of power by the military leadership (in turn) legitimized by the judiciary, also justifies public accountability of the judiciary in the country's transition to democracy.
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The case for such a process is arguably stronger if it is considered that the Nigerian judiciary was a creation of a democratic constitution. 7 The antecedents of the Nigerian judiciary imposes on it a heavier moral burden of public accountability for legitimizing what, in retrospect, was to be a string of authoritarian regimes that committed a range of atrocities on the people and deprived them of the right to determine how they were governed for about three decades, plundering the country's resources in the process and leaving not a few in misery.
The purview of accountability in transitions ought to be extended to the judiciary in recognition of its role in governance as the third arm in the tripod of state institutions.
Public accountability ensures comprehensive accounts of governance in transitional societies, which is essential to charting a transformative agenda for all the institutions of state. Institutional transformation is at the heart of the aspiration to reinstitute the rule of law in postauthoritarian as well as postconflict contexts.
Traditional notions of judicial independence gird objections to public accountability of the judiciary, setting it apart in the accountability paradigms applied to the other arms of government. I have argued that objections to judicial accountability are rooted in conceptions of the judicial function in liberal democracies (distinguished by the absence of social upheavals) to the neglect the dynamics of law and justice in transitional contexts.
In view of the concession that the interpretive role of the judiciary is not immune to the vagaries of time and place, but rather contingent on it (Barak 2003: 25) , fixation on a single ostensibly univocal judicial paradigm for all climes and periods is misplaced at best.
The Nigerian experience of military authoritarianism has not been one of physical decimation of the judiciary. Rather, the judiciary acquiesced to the rule of force in many cases. According to Mahmud, there are four possible options for the judiciary faced with the challenge of a coup d'état. The options are (1) validating the usurpation; (2) declaring the usurpation unconstitutional and hence invalid; (3) resignation, thereby refusing to adjudicate the legality of the demise of the very constitution under which the court was established; or (4) declaring the issue a nonjusticiable political question (Mahmud 1994: 100).
The courts in Nigeria chose the option of validating and legitimating the rebellious act.
The judiciary was quiescent (with few notable exceptions) to the suspension, abridgement, or outright abrogation of human rights and constitutionalism by successive military regimes. Years of military dictatorship thus bequeathed the country with a conservative and compromised judiciary. The versatility of the judiciary in making an expeditious reformation could have notable impact on the course of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in transitional societies.
It is widely accepted that independence of the judiciary is required for ensuring the rule of law prevails and guarantee of individual and group rights (Tolbert and Solomon 2006: 45-46) . But the very proposition presupposes an independent judiciary not one that acquiesces to the subversion of the rule of law; a charge at the door of judiciaries that give effect to military authoritarian rule like the Nigerian experience.
The lack of independence demonstrated by the judiciary in the pretransition period has arguably continued to feature in its recognition of questionable decrees (now styled acts) including those introduced on the very eve of the handover that were unconnected to the handover but instead dealt with the regulation of the capital market. In other words, the military were purporting to legislate for the civilian government a few hours before the civilian government took over. The courts in true fashion never questioned this (Ogowewo 2000) . Such judicial posturing constitutes eloquent testimony to the need for public accountability as a tool for effecting institutional transformation of the judiciary in the transition era.
The failure of the truth-telling process to challenge the judiciary to tell its truths in governance during the period of authoritarian rule in Nigeria constitutes a major flaw in the otherwise laudable conduct of the Oputa Panel. There is much to be said for the apprehension that the Nigerian judiciary still considerably staffed and controlled by judicial officers appointed by successive military regimes remains untransformed in the transition from authoritarian rule.
Critics have asserted that in the aftermath of the transition to civil rule in the country, "The Nigerian judiciary is still in disarray" (Oko 2006: 46) . This is due at least in part to the yawning accountability gap on judicial governance in the period of the country's experience of authoritarian rule. That gap is a threat to democracy and the rule of law in the country. It is a critical neglect that currently constitutes a veritable challenge to the transition in the country. The process of transition requires an independent and formidable judiciary to deepen democracy and rule of law after decades of authoritarian rule. The neglect may continue to haunt the Nigerian society in the foreseeable future. Worse still, it could engender a reversal of the landmarks achieved in the country's transition.
NOTES Throughout this article I use the terms "court" and "judiciary" interchangeably. 2 The themes of judicial independence and judicial accountability have attracted (and continues to attract) considerable scholarly interest of both legal writers and jurists alike. This is evidenced by the works documented in Atchison, Lawrence, and Russell (1999) . 3 Loughlin (2003: 162-75) : "Locke makes an important innovation in asserting that political power rests in individuals and that this power is delegated through their consent to an institution (whether monarch or parliament or both) which, in some form or the other, can be taken to be representative of the people" (ibid.: 165).
